#### 4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate The CA MAY support revocation of Short-lived Subscriber Certificates. With the exception of Short-lived Subscriber Certificates, the CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours and use the corresponding CRLReason (see Section 7.2.2) if one or more of the following occurs: 1. The Subscriber requests in writing, without specifying a CRLreason, that the CA revoke the Certificate (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL); 2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn); 3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise); 4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see ) (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise); 5. The CA obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon (CRLReason #4, superseded). With the exception of Short-lived Subscriber Certificates, the CA SHOULD revoke a certificate within 24 hours and MUST revoke a Certificate within 5 days and use the corresponding CRLReason (see Section 7.2.2) if one or more of the following occurs: 6. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of [Section 6.1.5](#615-key-sizes) and [Section 6.1.6](#616-public-key-parameters-generation-and-quality-checking) (CRLReason #4, superseded); 7. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn); 8. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn); 9. The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name Registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has terminated, or the Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name) (CRLReason #5, cessationOfOperation); 10. The CA is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully-Qualified Domain Name (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn); 11. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn); 12. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with these Requirements or the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement (CRLReason #4, superseded); 13. The CA determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn); 14. The CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL); 15. Revocation is required by the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement for a reason that is not otherwise required to be specified by this section 4.9.1.1 (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL); or 16. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise).

#### 4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if one or more of the following occurs: 1. The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the Certificate; 2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization; 3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise; 4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate; 5. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber’s Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed; or 6. The CA has reasonable assurance that a Certificate was used to sign Suspect Code. The CA SHOULD revoke a certificate within 24 hours and SHALL revoke a Certificate within 5 days if one or more of the following occurs: 7. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Section 6.1.5 and Section 6.1.6; 8. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused. 9. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use. 10. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate. 11. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with these Requirements or the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement. 12. The CA determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate. 13. The CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository. 14. Revocation is required by the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement. The CA MAY delay revocation based on a request from Application Software Suppliers where immediate revocation has a potentially large negative impact to the ecosystem. **Note:** Nothing herein prohibits a CA from revoking a Code Signing Certificate prior to these time frames.

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#### 4.9.1.1 Reasons for revoking a subscriber certificate The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if one or more of the following occurs: 1. The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the Certificate; 2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original Certificate Request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization; 3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise; 4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see ); 5. The CA obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or mailbox control for any Mailbox Address in the Certificate should not be relied upon. The CA SHOULD revoke a Certificate within 24 hours and SHALL revoke a Certificate within 5 days if one or more of the following occurs: 6. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of [Section 6.1.5](#615-key-sizes) and [Section 6.1.6](#616-public-key-parameters-generation-and-quality-checking); 7. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused; 8. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use; 9. The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of an email address or Fully-Qualified Domain Name in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g., a court or arbitrator has revoked the right to use an email address or Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Subscriber has terminated, or the account holder has failed to maintain the active status of the email address or Domain Name); 10. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate; 11. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with these Requirements or the CA's CP and/or CPS; 12. The CA determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate; 13. The CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository; 14. Revocation is required by the CA's CP and/or CPS; or 15. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed.

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### 4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements The following SHALL apply for communicating the status of Certificates which include an Authority Information Access extension with an id-ad-ocsp accessMethod. OCSP responders operated by the CA SHALL support the HTTP GET method, as described in RFC 6960 and/or RFC 5019. The CA MAY process the Nonce extension (`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.2`) in accordance with RFC 8954. The validity interval of an OCSP response is the difference in time between the `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate` field, inclusive. For purposes of computing differences, a difference of 3,600 seconds shall be equal to one hour, and a difference of 86,400 seconds shall be equal to one day, ignoring leap-seconds. For the status of Subscriber Certificates: 1. OCSP responses MUST have a validity interval greater than or equal to eight hours; 2. OCSP responses MUST have a validity interval less than or equal to ten days; 3. For OCSP responses with validity intervals less than sixteen hours, then the CA SHALL update the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol prior to one-half of the validity period before the nextUpdate. 4. For OCSP responses with validity intervals greater than or equal to sixteen hours, then the CA SHALL update the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol at least eight hours prior to the nextUpdate, and no later than four days after the thisUpdate. For the status of Subordinate CA Certificates: * The CA SHALL update information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol i. at least every twelve months; and ii. within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate. If the OCSP responder receives a request for the status of a certificate serial number that is "unused", then the responder SHOULD NOT respond with a "good" status. If the OCSP responder is for a CA that is not Technically Constrained in line with [Section 7.1.2.3](#7123-technically-constrained-non-tls-subordinate-ca-certificate-profile) or [Section 7.1.2.5](#7125-technically-constrained-tls-subordinate-ca-certificate-profile), the responder MUST NOT respond with a "good" status for such requests. The CA SHOULD monitor the OCSP responder for requests for "unused" serial numbers as part of its security response procedures. The OCSP responder MAY provide definitive responses about "reserved" certificate serial numbers, as if there was a corresponding Certificate that matches the Precertificate [RFC6962]. A certificate serial number within an OCSP request is one of the following three options: 1. "assigned" if a Certificate with that serial number has been issued by the Issuing CA, using any current or previous key associated with that CA subject; or 2. "reserved" if a Precertificate [RFC6962] with that serial number has been issued by a. the Issuing CA; or b. a Precertificate Signing Certificate, as defined in [Section 7.1.2.4](#7124-technically-constrained-precertificate-signing-ca-certificate-profile), associated with the Issuing CA; or 3. "unused" if neither of the previous conditions are met.

### 4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements Effective 2023-09-15, OCSP responders operated by the CA SHALL support the HTTP GET method, as described in RFC 6960 and/or RFC 5019. Effective 2023-09-15, the validity interval of an OCSP response is the difference in time between the `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate` field, inclusive. For purposes of computing differences, a difference of 3,600 seconds shall be equal to one hour, and a difference of 86,400 seconds shall be equal to one day, ignoring leap-seconds. CAs MAY provide OCSP responses for Code Signing Certificates and Timestamp Certificates for the time period specified in their CPS, which MAY be at least 10 years after the expiration of the certificate. If the CA provides OCSP responses, the CA SHALL support an OCSP capability using the GET method for Certificates issued in accordance with these Requirements. For the status of Subordinate CA Certificates: * If the Issuing CA provides OCSP responses, the Issuing CA SHALL update information provided via an OCSP response at least every twelve months and within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate. For the status of Code Signing Certificates: * If the Subordinate CA provides OCSP responses, the CA SHALL update information provided via an OCSP response at least every four days. OCSP responses from this service MUST have a maximum expiration time of ten days. For the status of Timestamp Certificates: * If the Subordinate CA provides OCSP responses, the Subordinate CA SHALL update information provided via an OCSP response at least every twelve months and within 24 hours after revoking a Timestamp Certificate. A certificate serial number within an OCSP request is "assigned" if a Certificate with that serial number has been issued by the Issuing CA, using any current or previous key associated with that CA subject. If the OCSP responder receives a request for the status of a certificate serial number that is not "assigned", then the responder MUST NOT respond with a "good" status.

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### 4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements OCSP responders operated by the CA SHALL support the HTTP GET method, as described in [RFC 6960](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6960) and/or [RFC 5019](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5019). The validity interval of an OCSP response is the difference in time between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate field, inclusive. For purposes of computing differences, a difference of 3,600 seconds SHALL be equal to one hour, and a difference of 86,400 seconds SHALL be equal to one day, ignoring leap-seconds. For the status of Subscriber Certificates: 1. OCSP responses SHALL have a validity interval greater than or equal to eight hours; 2. OCSP responses SHALL have a validity interval less than or equal to ten days; 3. For OCSP responses with validity intervals less than sixteen hours, then the CA SHALL update the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol prior to one-half of the validity period before the nextUpdate; and 4. For OCSP responses with validity intervals greater than or equal to sixteen hours, then the CA SHALL update the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol at least eight hours prior to the nextUpdate, and no later than four days after the thisUpdate. For the status of Subordinate CA Certificates, the CA SHALL update information provided via OCSP: 1. at least every twelve months; and 2. within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate. If the OCSP responder receives a request for the status of a Certificate serial number that is "unused", then the responder SHOULD NOT respond with a "good" status. If the OCSP responder is for a CA that is not Technically Constrained in line with [Section 7.1.5](#715-name-constraints), the responder SHALL NOT respond with a "good" status for such requests. The CA SHOULD monitor the OCSP responder for requests for "unused" serial numbers as part of its security response procedures. A Certificate serial number within an OCSP request is "assigned" if a Certificate with that serial number has been issued by the Issuing CA, using any current or previous key associated with that CA subject, or "unused" if otherwise.

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